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Roderick Chisholm has claimed that the philosophical arguments that are 
designed to show that 'tense is illusory' are "very easy to refute, and ... 
not  worthy of  ... consideration" 1. In this note I would like to show that 
(1) given Chisholm's view on temporal relations in The First Person there 
is an argument against tense that is by no means easy to refute and that (2) 
if Chisholm modifies his analysis of  temporal relations so as to avoid the 
objection to tense, then we will be better able to understand one motivation 
behind those who claim that tense (not  time) is unreal. 
According to Chisholm, if we take tense seriously then tensed sentences 
such as 'Socrates is now sitting' and 'The apple was green', express or refer to 
states of  affairs that may obtain, then cease to obtain, and then obtain 
again. In addition to recurring tensed states of  affairs, Chisholm's ontology 
of  time includes temporal relations. Chisholm characterizes the relations 
earlier and later as follows: 
For example, the past-tensed 'p obtained later than q did' would be 'p was such that it 
obtains, q does not obtain, and q did obtain '2 . 
Is Chisholm's view of  temporal relations expressed in this passage compatible 
with his tensed theory of  time? I think not,  and I shall attempt to explain 
why. 
Given that tensed states of  affairs may recur, it may be true that: 
(A) 'Socrates is sitting obtained later than Socrates is sitting'. 
But given Chisholm's views on temporal relations, (A) becomes: 
(B) 'Socrates is sitting was such that: (i) it obtains, (ii) Socrates is 
sitting does not obtain, and (iii) Socrates is sitting did obtain'. 
Since (i) and (ii) are incompatible, the state of  affairs expressed by (B) is 
impossible and therefore (A) is impossible too. Consequently, given Chis- 
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holm's characterization of the relations of earlier and later, tensed states of 
affairs cannot recur, and tense is unreal. 
The way out of this argument is to give a different analysis of temporal 
relations and in a recent letter Chisholm did just that. He said: 
I had wri t ten in The First Person (p. 128): "For  example,  the  past-tensed 'p obtained 
later than  q did' would be 'p was such that  it obtains,  q does not  obtain, and q did 
obtain '  " .  I was thinking of  later as being asymmetr ic  and nonreflexive,  so tha t  nothing 
could be said to be later than  itself. But  if a state o f  affairs obtains,  then  ceases to 
obtain,  and then  obtains again, then,  I suppose,  it does obtain later than  itself. (Since 
I arrived in the  seminar room yesterday and also arrived there the  day before yesterday,  
did I arrive there later than  I arrived there? I suppose so. In any case, I arrived there 
after I arrived there.) 
What  if we analyze 'p obtained later than  q did' this way: p was such that:  it obtains 
after q obtains? 3 
Chisholm's revised analysis of later takes both tense and temporal relations 
seriously, but Russellians might claim that it does not take temporal rela- 
tions seriously enough. Let me explain. 
In the above letter Chisholm claims that when he gave this analysis of  'p 
obtained later than q' in The First Person he was "thinking of later as 
being asymmetric and nonreflexive, so that nothing could be said to be later 
than itself ' '4 . Many philosophers and non-philosophers alike would say that 
Chisholm's earlier thinking about earlier and later was not whimsical or based 
on any momentary loss of good sense, but rather that Chisholm's thought 
struck at the essence of time. In other words, Russellians would claim that if 
one is really going to take temporal relations seriously, then one must provide 
an account of them that preserves their being asymmetrical and nonreflexive. 
Unfortunately, Chisholm's new ahalysis of 'p obtained later than q' does not 
do this Since 'p '  and 'q '  may stand for the same state of affairs, say, Socrates 
is sitting and that state of affairs was such that it obtains after it obtains. 
Thus, Chisholm gives up his initial thought that later is asymmetric in order to 
preserve the reality of tense. For the Russellians, however, giving up the logi- 
cal properties of temporal relations is too big a price to pay for tense, and 
rather than pay it they deny that there are recurring tensed states of affairs. 
We see then, that one motive for claiming that tense is unreal stems from 
the desire to preserve the logical properties of temporal relations. Of course, 
to offer a motive for a view is not to give a justification of it. Yet, it has been 
argued by Russell and others that if the time-series is to be constituted, suc- 
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cession mus t  be an asymmetr ica l  transit ive relat ion,  s To  pursue Russell 's  
claim wou ld ,  however ,  take us far b e y o n d  the  scope o f  this no te .  
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